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In Bengal, religious charisma can shape conversations and narratives, not outcomes. Power remains with those who control institutions, welfare delivery, and electoral arithmetic
People carry bricks in view of former TMC MLA Humayun Kabir’s plan to lay the foundation stone for a mosque, modelled on Ayodhya’s Babri Masjid. (PTI)
Every election cycle in West Bengal produces a familiar mirage—a Muslim cleric-turned-politician or politician-turned-preacher, a burst of media hype, breathless television debates on ‘Muslims versus Muslims’, and predictions of a fractured minority vote that could upend Trinamool Congress’s dominance.
However, when the results are revealed, almost inevitably, the mirage dissolves. Peerzada Abbas Siddiqui and his party Indian Secular Front (ISF) were the most recent examples. The same pattern is being rehearsed with now-suspended leader Humayun Kabir’s religious yet political mobilisation and the invocation of emotive symbols like the Babri Masjid. The reason is structural, not sentimental.
Muslim political behaviour in Bengal has traditionally been driven less by religious charisma and more by electoral rationality for decades. Despite internal theological, sectarian, and other social differences among the Peers (clerics), reformists, and shrine-followers, the community has historically voted with a singular objective. And, it has always been maximising political security in a first-past-the-post system where fragmentation equals invisibility.
Charismatic figures emerge during polls. From Taha Siddiqui to Abbas Siddiqui, from Siddiqullah Chowdhury to Humayun Kabir, there are many phases of such sudden pre-election formations in the state. The narrative always appeared substantial and significant—a religious leader challenging the ‘monopoly’ of Trinamool over Muslim votes, indicating a new assertiveness, a generational churn.
Yet when the ballots were counted during 2021 assembly elections, ISF’s influence remained geographically confined to a constituency with a limited spill over. Its vote transferability appeared weak, and its ability to disrupt outcomes looked marginal at the state level. This was not a failure of leadership, it was a failure of arithmetic.
What Does The Pattern Say?
A close look at Bengal’s past election results and its pattern reflect that Bengal’s Muslim electorate is acutely aware about the symbolic assertion without governing leverage. And they also know that it is a luxury they cannot afford. The fear of vote-splitting, particularly in contests where the BJP is the principal challenger, acts as a powerful disciplining force. Consolidation, therefore, is not ideological loyalty to Trinamool Congress—it is tactical insurance.
The same pattern is now being rehearsed with Humayun Kabir’s political mobilisation and the invocation of emotive symbols like the Babri Masjid. But emotional resonance does not automatically translate into booth-level rebellion or booth handling and management. Religious symbolism mobilises sentiment but elections demand machinery.
Local clergy-based parties struggle with three structural deficits in the state. These deficits include absence of a state-wide organisation, lack of credible non-Muslim allies and faces, coupled with limited appeal beyond grievance politics. Bengal’s Muslims are not a homogenous bloc waiting to be ‘awakened’; they are voters who understand the cost of political adventurism.
Internal contests or factional feuds do occur like in Murshidabad, parts of Malda, pockets of North and South 24 Parganas. But, these shifts rarely survive the broader canvas. The final weeks of campaigning usually see a return to consolidation, guided less by faith leaders and more by neighbourhood calculations like who can win here, who can stop whom, and who will still be standing the morning after results.
In Bengal, religious charisma can shape conversations and narratives, not outcomes. Power remains with those who control institutions, welfare delivery, and electoral arithmetic. Until a Muslim-led formation can offer all three, the cults will come and go, but the vote will stay largely where it has always been.
December 25, 2025, 09:15 IST
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